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The rise and (coming) fall of 
efficiency as the ruler of antitrust 
BY ROBERT H. LANDE* 
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are 
able to give a firm answer to one question: What is 
the point of the law-what are its goals? Everything 
else follows from the answer we give. 
429 
R. BORK, The Antitrust Paradox at 50 (1978) 
The debate over the legitimate goals of antitrust is ceaseless and 
its practical resolution influenced by politics. The answer often 
given in the past, and particularly during the Warren Court era 
when a heavy emphasis was placed on social and political factors, 
contrasts sharply with the consensus view during the Reagan 
Administration that only economic efficiency counts. Since anti-
trust moves in cycles, a natural question arises-will antitrust 
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continue to stand upon a foundation of efficiency, return to the 
old social and political perspective, or embrace some third view 
of its proper direction? 
This article will trace the genesis of the efficiency approach to 
antitrust and attempt to predict its future. Although the effi-
ciency approach has triumphed over the social and political view 
through clever articulation and a promise of superior implemen-
tation and predictability, it too is likely to be replaced, by a 
"price to consumers" or "wealth transfer" standard. This new 
approach asserts that the antitrust laws were enacted to give 
consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods. I It 
condemns the use of market power to artificially raise prices and 
stresses that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent wealth 
extractions from consumers by firms with market power. Con-
sumers, not cartels, were given the fruits of competitive capital-
ism. This article asserts that the wealth transfer approach is 
starting to replace the efficiency standard and eventually will 
succeed at implementing Congressional populist sentiment in an 
administrable, predictable manner. 
I. The rise of economic efficiency 
A. Bork's "strict constructionist" view oj the legislative history 
The view of the goals of the antitrust laws that almost uni-
versally prevailed until less than a generation ago was decidedly 
populist. Various social and political goals were deemed impor-
tant to the antitrust laws' framers. These included the preven-
tion of industrial concentration,2 the reduction of the political 
1 This article will argue that Congress, in passing the antitrust 
laws, helped to define the property right that we today term "consumers 
surplus," and awarded this property right to consumers. Congress con-
demned the uncompensated taking of this property right by firms with 
market power. 
2 Arnold, The Economic Purpose oj the Antitrust Laws, 26 MISS. 
L.J. 207, 207-08 (1955). 
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influence of large firms and promotion of individual liberty, 3 
the promotion of small business and the creation of entrepre-
neurial opportunity.4 The social and political view held center 
stage virtually until the advent of the Reagan Administration,S 
and appears to have breathed its dying gasp only under the 
administration of Chairman Pertschuk, head of the Federal 
Trade Commission during the Carter Administration.6 
Few antitrust scholars believe that antitrust should return to 
a Warren Court approach based largely upon social and politi-
cal concerns.' Today there is a consensus that this type of anti-
trust was far too interventionist. In addition to overly strict 
substantive standards, the excesses included the practical prob-
lems that inevitably arose in the implementation of a relatively 
3 See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. 
REv. 377, 377-82 (1965). 
4 Id. at 382-84; Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Com-
petition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 
(1977). 
5 Many moderate and liberal antitrust academics began to move 
away from the social and political orientation well before 1980. Many 
politicians, antitrust enforcers and judges were, however, somewhat 
slower to rely completely upon economic analysis. 
6 See, for example, M. Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Com-
mission, Remarks a1 The Eleventh New England Antitrust Conference, 
Boston, Massachusetts 10 (November 18, 1977): 
[A]lthough efficiency considerations are important, they 
alone should not dictate competition policy. Competition policy 
must sometimes choose between greater efficiency, which may 
carry with it the promise of lower prices, and other social 
objectives, such as the dispersal of power, which may result in 
marginally higher prices. I~ 1977, no responsive competition 
policy can neglect the social and environmental harms produced 
as unwelcome by-products of the marketplace: resource deple-
tion, energy waste, environmental contamination, worker alien-
ation, the psychological and social consequences of marketing 
stimulated demands. 
7 See, e.g., sources cited in Fox, The Modernization of the Anti-
trust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981). 
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amorphous social/political orientation. These problems helped 
make the antitrust world receptive to a more conservative alter-
native that promised superior implementation, clarity and pre-
dictability. 
If one scholarly work were singled out for credit for launch-
ing the efficiency-oriented view of antitrust it would surely be 
the seminal 1966 article by (then) Professor Robert Bork,s the 
foundation for both his own 1978 masterwork9 and the views of 
countless other conservative scholars. lo Bork asserted that his 
analysis was a strict constructionist view of the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act. In a lengthy, heavily footnoted text he 
developed the argument that the original framers of the Sher-
man Act had a single intent: to enhance economic efficiency. 
Bork argued that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed 
up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impair-
ing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain 
or a net loss in consumer welfare."11 Bork further asserted that 
there was "not a scintilla of support" in the Act's legislative 
history for "broad social, political, and ethical mandates. "12 
Bork explicitly rejected distributive (i.e., wealth transfer) issues 
8 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. 
L. & ECON. 7 (1966). For a more complete analysis of Bork's legislative 
history conclusions see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Pri-
mary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 
34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
9 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). 
10 For example, R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 8-23 (1976) did not undertake a detailed analysis of the Sherman 
Act's legislative history. He instead approvingly cited Bork for the argu-
ment that Congress intended that only economic efficiency playa role in 
antitrust. For other examples, see Lande, supra note 8, at 67-69. 
In addition, Posner believes that monopoly profits may not exist; 
what would otherwise be the transfer may be transformed into ineffi-
ciency through rent-seeking behavior. Id. at 11-12. If he is correct, the 
wealth transfer and efficiency 'approaches to antitrust are similar or 
identical. 
11 R. BORK, supra note 9, at 91. 
12 Bork, supra note 8, at 10. 
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as a possible area of congressional concern: "[Ilt seems clear 
the income distribution effects of economic activity should be 
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust 
legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift 
in income distribution does not lessen total wealth. . . . "13 
Bork developed his argument through a detailed analysis of 
the 1890 legislative debates. He pointed to dozens of statements 
revealing an overriding Congressional concern that trusts and 
certain other business forms would acquire monopoly (or mar-
ket) power that would give them the ability to artificially raise 
prices and restrict output. 14 Bork wove these quotations into a 
convincing case that this concern preoccupied Congress. IS He 
then used modern economic analysis to explain how monopoly 
power leading to higher prices for consumers can produce a 
form of economic inefficiency termed "allocative ineffi-
ciency. "16 (The explanation of why monopoly pricing produces 
allocative inefficiency, a reduction in the total wealth of society, 
is extremely complex. I') Bork reasoned that since we now 
13 R. BORK, supra note 9, at 111. 
14 Bork, supra note 8, passim. For example, Senator Sherman 
asked that Congress protect the public from trusts that "restrain com-
merce, turn it from its natural courses, increase the price of articles, and 
therefore diminish the amount of commerce." 21 Congo Rec. 2462 
(1890). Sherman also stated: "The sole object of such a combination is 
to make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or 
lower prices, as will best promote selfish interests. . . . Its governing 
motive is to increase the profits of the parties composing it. The law of 
selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the 
interest of the consumer .... [w]hen it embraces the great body of all 
the corporations engaged in a particular industry in all of the States of 
the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any article 
produced." [d. at 2457. 
15 Bork, supra note 8, passim. 
16 [d. 
17 To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive 
level. The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers 
than they would cost society to produce. This foregone production of 
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"know" that the "only" harm to "consumer welfare" from 
higher prices is economic inefficiency, Congressional displeasure 
with market power can fairly be equated with a concern about 
economic efficiency. He then presented a smaller, although still 
significant, number of quotations that manifest a Congressional 
desire to preserve and enhance corporate productive efficiency. 18 
On the basis of this evidence, Bork concluded that the antitrust 
laws embody only a concern for "consumer welfare" which he 
equated with the "maximization of wealth or consumer want 
satisfaction"19 and the aggregate efficiency of our economy.20 
Notice the subtle yet crucial change in terminology. Bork 
used "consumer welfare" as an Orwellian term of art that has 
little or nothing to do with the welfare of true consumers FI His 
desire to maximize "consumer welfare" (which he defines as 
economic efficiency) carries with it no concern about the wealth 
extracted from consumers and transferred to firms with market 
power as a result of the higher prices that arise from cartel or 
other prohibited behavior. Bork thus defined "consumers" to 
goods worth more than their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the 
"allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For example, suppose that wid-
gets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production plus a 
competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for $2.00. A 
potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will 
not purchase at the $2.00 level. Since a competitive market would have 
sold them widgets for less than they were worth to him, the monopo-
list's reduced production has decreased the consumer's satisfaction 
without producing any countervailing benefits for anyone. This pure 
loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." For an extended discussion and 
formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative inefficiency, see 
E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th 
ed. 1982). 
18 Bork, supra note 8, at 26-31. 
19 Bork, supra note 8, at 7. 
20 R. BORK, supra note 9, at 91. 
21 Bork did not invent the term but chose it from the available 
options. 
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include monopolists and cartels.22 Antitrust based on his defini-
tion of "consumer welfare" makes no distinction between 
"real" consumers-the purchasers of goods and services-and 
the firms with market power that raise prices and thereby 
extract wealth from purchasers. Higher prices to consumers are 
fine with Bork so long as the monopolist or the cartel produces 
more efficiently. In fact, the only "consumers" sure to benefit 
under Bork's regime are monopolists and cartels.23 
The view that economic efficiency should be the only value 
that counts in the antitrust analysis was quickly embraced by 
the entirety of the Chicago School2A and many leading "moder-
ate" antitrust analysts as well.2S Although this view had been 
picking up adherents for more than a decade,26 it was not really 
implemented until President Reagan's election. 
22 I am indebted to Professor Salop for this and related articula-
tions of this concept. 
23 I am indebted to John Kirkwood for this formulation. He 
observes that in a technical sense "consumer welfare" has increased but 
that the cartels and monopolists acquire all of this increase. In the clas-
sic tradeoff situation "true" consumers gain none of the efficiency ben-
efits, absorb some of the allocative inefficiency losses, and have their 
surplus extracted by the firms with market power. 
24 See sources cited supra note 10. Of course, some may have 
adopted the belief that antitrust should be based entirely upon efficiency 
for reasons having little or nothing to do with Bork's legislative history 
analysis. 
25 See, e.g., 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALY-
SIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 149, n. 2 (1980). 
26 Other milestones in the debate included two symposia: Antitrust 
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social 
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977); The Goals of 
Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). The 
1973 Airlie House Conference was also extremely influential. The 
efficiency-oriented Chicago view largely triumphed over the social! 
political view on all three occasions. 
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B. Administrability arguments 
Bork's argument that only an efficiency approach to anti-
trust is clear and predictable for businesses also won many con-
verts to the efficiency school. Even many who strongly 
suspected that Congress may have intended the antitrust laws to 
encompass more had to admit that the social-and-political 
school of antitrust was extremely difficult to administer. 27 Bork 
recently has taken his assertion of superior administrability 
much further; he has argued that courts cannot include values 
other than economic efficiency in antitrust analysis "without 
engaging in a task that is so unconfinedly legislative as to be 
unconstitutional. "28 
As a practical matter Bork admitted that to actually balance 
the triangles and rectangles that inevitably arose from an 
efficiency-based analysis was impossible on a case-by-case 
basis.29 But he asserted that only rules based on economic effi-
27 Consider the plight of an honest, aggressive business operating 
under a "big is bad, small is good" antitrust regime. What mergers can 
it lawfully undertake? What vertical restraints or pricing decisions can it 
implement? What are the rules under which we judge its conduct? An 
efficiency approach carried out through rules, such as clearly designed 
merger guidelines (but not the relatively unprincipled analysis conducted 
within the Reagan Administration) would indeed be more workable than 
a "big is bad, small is good" approach. 
28 Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 21, 24 (1985). 
29 Bork provided the following summary of what a case-by-case 
efficiency analysis of a horizontal merger actually would involve: 
Passably accurate measurement of the actual situation [includ-
ing an estimate of efficiencies and deadweight loss] is not even a 
theoretical possibility; much less is there any hope of arriving at 
a correct estimate of the hypothetical situation. Consider two of 
the factors that would have to be known: the demand curve 
over all possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost 
curve over those same ranges. Only by knowing where marginal 
cost and demand intersect could one know whether there was a 
restriction of output and what its size was. Nobody knows these 
curves. Even the companies involved do not. . . . 
(Footnote continued on following page) 
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ciency could lead to predictable antitrust decisionmaking. By 
avoiding the endless and imprecise debates over "how big is too 
big," "how small is good" or "how much more should con-
sumers pay to prevent bigness and/or preserve smallness," the 
efficiency view of antitrust with its single quest offered the 
promise of clarity and predictability. Under this approach the 
decisionmakers were charged with figuring out, at least as a the-
oretical matter, the applicable triangles and rectangles, and then 
with designing rules that would implicitly incorporate them. 
(Baxter has similarly asserted that "economic efficiency pro-
vides the only workable standard from which to derive opera-
tional rules and by which the effectiveness of such rules can be 
judged.»3O) Even those whose instincts told them something was 
wrong with Bork's analysis of the legislative history were under-
standably dazzled by the economics and found it difficult to 
answer Bork's administrability arguments. 
The administrability claims may have gained more converts 
than the belief that Congress in 1890 cared only about economic 
efficiency. Perhaps what took place in the minds of most 
observers was, in effect, the following: It is clear that in 1890 
Congress was concerned with prices increasing as a result of 
market power, and it is clear that higher prices lead to eco-
nomic inefficiency. Since economic efficiency is much easier to 
implement than a "big is bad, small is good" policy, let's 
choose what seems to be a plausible view of the legislative his-
tory since it leads to the most predictable implementation. 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
There is a good reason why firms do not know these things, and 
it is the same reason why they cannot be known through an 
antitrust trial. The demand curve is not known because it 
changes continually and because the company is not constantly 
plotting it by running its prices up and down. The attempt to do 
so might make a minor contribution to science, but quite a 
research grant would be required, since the losses incurred in an 
attempt by a major company might make serious inroads on the 
resources of even the Ford Foundation. 
R. BORK, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
30 Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftman's View, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 618, 621 (1983) ("Draftman's View"). 
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Relative to the then-existing situation, the efficiency standard 
certainly brought the promise of clarity and predictability. All the 
decisionmakers had to do was ascertain and balance crisp, clear 
triangles and rectangles that easily (?) could be predicted in 
advance by the affected parties. Bork (and others) recognized, 
moreover, that since rarely in practice could we accurately predict 
or measure the appropriate efficiencies and inefficiencies, to 
enhance administrability and predictability we should implement 
the efficiency approach through rules, not by case-by-case trade-
offs. Thus, for example, Bork31 (like Posner)32 believes that 
mergers should be evaluated solely in terms of their efficiency 
effects, yet would not allow an efficiencies defense. Their 
approach to mergers giving rise both to allocative inefficiency 
from higher prices and productive efficiency gains from, for 
example, economies of scale, would be to set the merger guideline 
thresholds at a level calculated to allow most productive effi-
ciency gains and prevent most allocative inefficiency losses. They 
would perform the market power/efficiencies trade-off implic-
itly, but not have an explicit, case-by-case efficiencies defense. 33 
Their efficiency approach would thus be implemented through 
relatively clear rules that would optimize business planning and 
judicial administration. 
c. Efficiency's embrace by the Reagan administration 
It is hardly surprising that President Reagan's first choices 
to head the antitrust enforcement agencies adopted the effi-
ciency standard. The administration's first Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust, William Baxter, was succinct and clear: 
31 R. BORK, supra note 9, at 221-22. 
32 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 
(1976). 
33 R. BORK, supra note 9, at 221-22; R. Posner, supra note 10. 
Efficiency : 439 
"The only goal of antitrust is economic efficiency."34 So was 
his successor, Paul McGrath. 3s This view was also embraced by 
James C. Miller III, Reagan's first Chairman of the Federal 
Trade Commission, most spectacularly in the Allied Corp. 
case. 36 
Allied appears to have been the first antitrust case where the 
differences between the efficiency and price approaches to anti-
trust clearly were articulated and were pivotal to the enforce-
ment decision.:r1 Allied involved a merger that would have 
increased the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in various 
industrial acid markets by as much as 416, to a level of as high 
as 4,026 (figures that normally would suggest a challenge). The 
FTC economist assigned to the case, Dr. Kenneth Kelly, argued 
that even if the merger led to a price increase of 100/0 in the 
affected markets (a generous estimate in light of the facts) the 
merger would be unlikely to lead to any inefficiency since 
demand for the acids was completely inelastic (i.e., even if price 
34 Taylor, A Talk With Antitrust Chief William Baxter, Wall St. J., 
Mar. 4, 1982, at 28, col. 3. Baxter has also stated: "The fundamental 
premise of our economic system is that the free market will achieve the 
greatest possible efficiency in the allocation of resources and thereby 
yield maximum productivity .... One of my principal objectives since 
joining the Department has been to attempt to ensure that the antitrust 
laws are enforced and interpreted to achieve that goal." Productivity in 
the American Economy, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Employment and Productivity of the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1982) (statement of Wil-
liam F. Baxter, Assistant Atty. Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice); Draftsman's View, supra note 30, at 619-20; Separation of 
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 'Common Law' Nature of 
Antitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 661, 691-93 (1982). 
35 McGrath, Statement of Mr. McGrath, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 131, 
131 (1985). 
36 In re Allied Corp., FfC File No. 811 0191 (Dec. 8, 1982) 
("Allied"). 
37 This account of Allied is taken from FTC: WATCH, Pub. No. 
158, "Cost-Benefit Analysis, Miller Style," 1, 1-5 (Jan. 14, 1983). 
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rose by 100/0, the quantity sold would not diminish).38 Thus, the 
10% price rise would "only" lead to a transfer of wealth from 
the products' consumers to the industrial acids' producers, a 
concern that Kelly (following Bork's lead) deemed irrelevant. 
Moreover, there would be some inefficiency created if the Com-
mission forced the firms to accept a consent order mandating 
that Allied divest the affected assets. These costs included bro-
kerage fees and private and FTC complia:nce costs. The Bureau 
of Economics analysis concluded that since any resulting mone-
tary transfer from the products' consumers to its producers was 
irrelevant, and since ordering the divestiture would cause ineffi-
ciency, the merger should be approved even assuming prices 
would rise by 10%.39 
The issues in Allied can be illustrated by a version of Profes-
sor Williamson's famous diagram.40 The rise in price from the 
competitive level (pc) to the monopoly level (pm) normally pro-
duces both economic inefficiency (triangle I) and transfer of 
wealth from consumers to the firm with market power (rectan-
gle T). Productive efficiency gains from the merger would lower 
the firm's costs, from Pc down to the lower dashed line, result-
ing in the efficiency savings marked E. In the Allied case, area 
E was essentially nonexistent-since demand was inelastic within 
the relevant range the demand curve was vertical. If the wealth 
transfer from consumers to the merged firm, area T, did not 
count, the productive efficiency benefits from allowing the 
merger would mandate its approval. 
Chairman Miller cast the only vote endorsing the efficiency-
based recommendation not to sue. He termed any monopoly 
overcharges mere "revenue transfers" that should not factor 
into the enforcement analysis. Miller's decision may have been 
38 ld. 
39 Kelly's novel analysis was endorsed by Bureau of Economics 
Director Dr. Robert Tollison. Tollison also would not count the wealth 
transfer effects of the merger. See 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) 1061 (Dec. 9, 1982). 
40 Williamson first presented his analysis in Economies as an Anti-
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influenced by an article by Professor Timothy Muris (later 
Miller's Director of the Bureau of Competition) that was pre-
cisely on point. Muris argued that only efficiency should count 
in merger analysis and that a merger producing a net increase in 
efficiency should be allowed even if it led to significantly higher 
prices to consumers for a significant period of time.41 
41 Muris presented a detailed analysis of the legislative history of 
the Celler-Kefauver Act and argued that Congress meant for mergers to 
be evaluated solely in efficiency terms. See Muris, The Efficiency 
Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 
381, 393-402 (1980). For a point-by-point refutation of Muris' analysis, 
see Lande, supra note 8, at 132 n.2S8. 
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The Commissioners appointed by President Carter dis-
agreed. They all voted to accept a proposed consent order that 
included divestiture of the offending assets. They understood 
clearly the differences between the efficiency and wealth extrac-
tion approaches; Commissioner Clanton, joined by Commis-
sioners Bailey and Pertschuk, concluded that "preventing such 
transfers is one of the goals of the antitrust laws. "42 
Another illustration of the Reagan administration's single-
mindedness can be found in the DOJ's 1985 Vertical Restraints 
Guidelines.43 Its section on tying lists a large number of reasons 
why tying can be procompetitive, but acknowledges no circum-
stance under which purely private uses of tying, even by a cartel 
or monopolist, could ever be anticompetitive.44 One inevitably 
leaves this section, the Guidelines' most illogical, wondering 
why it does not treat tying as per se legal. The explanation for 
their approach undoubtedly lies in the Department's desire to 
equate "anticompetitive" with "inefficient"; i. e., their desire to 
implement the view that the only concern of antitrust is effi-
ciency. The Department's ideological blinders must have ,caused 
them to misread or ignore the tying standard set forth in Jeffer-
son Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) 
("Hyde").4s This case can best be explained as condemning cer-
tain instances of tying because of wealth transfer effects.46 
42 FTC: WATCH, supra note 37, at 3. 
43 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Distribution Restraints Guide-
lines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985). 
44 Id., at Sec. 5. 
4S Hyde involved a contract between a fIrm of anesthesiologists and 
a hospital requiring all anesthesiological services for the hospital's 
patients to be performed by that firm. A competing anesthesiologist 
tried to obtain privileges to practice at the hospital and was denied on 
the basis of the contract. For a more detailed discussion see Sims, 
"'Monsanto,' 'Hyde' Rulings Put Baxter Slightly Ahead," Legal 
Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 14. 
46 For a more complete analysis of tying arrangements using both 
wealth transfer and effIciency criteria, see R. Lande, "Untangling 
Tying" (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (draft). 
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Although the maj ority opinion in Hyde certainly appreciated 
the value of efficient tying arrangements,47 it complained that 
they also "may be used as a counting device to effect price dis-
crimination, and they may be used to force a full line of prod-
ucts on the customer so as to extract more easily from him a 
monopoly return on one unique product in the line.' '48 Tying 
was held to be anticompetitive since it "can increase the social 
costs of market power by facilitating price discrimination, 
thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they would be 
absent the tie. . . . "49 The court explained how anti-
competitive tying can lead to undesirable extractions of wealth 
by the firm with market power: "Sales of the tied item can be 
used to measure demand for the tying item; purchasers with 
greater needs for the tied item make larger purchases and in 
effect must pay a higher price to obtain the tying item."so 
While five Justices' views can best be explained in terms of 
wealth transfers, O'Connor's concurring opinion is close to 
pure Chicago School analysis. This opinion largely ignores the 
producer-consumer battle, holding that the relevant question is 
whether tying can ever cause inefficiency. It argues that this 
rarely occursSI and that even in these unlikely circumstances the 
inefficiencies from the tie must be balanced against any eco-
nomic benefits.52 It condemned a tying firm's "exploitation of 
47 "Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public 
weal is-[the assumption] that the public, acting through the market's 
impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources." Hyde, at 
12 (quoting Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 
(1953». 
48 Hyde at 13 n. 19 (quoting Fortner Enterprises v. -United States 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512 (1968) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes 
omitted). 
49 Hyde at 14 (citing United States Steel v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 
U.S. 610, 617 (1977). 
50 ld. at 15 n. 23. 
51 ld. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
52 ld. at 40-41. 
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consumers"S3 and the "increase [in] the profit it can extract 
from ... consumers .... "S4 The opinion, however, held that 
even the use of tying to price discriminate is not necessarily 
undesirabless and largely focused upon the potential efficiencies 
and inefficiencies created by tying arrangements. S6 It cited 
primarily the work of BorkS7 and other Chicago School 
scholars. S8 
Thus, the views of most Reagan administration antitrust 
enforcers, as well as the views of many Reagan appointed 
judges, are clear and pure. But while the Supreme Court has 
become increasingly receptive to the use of economic analysis in 
antitrust analysis it has never accepted the administration's sug-
gestion to confme antitrust to effi~iency considerations. 
D. The Supreme Court's partial embrace of efficiency 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that when it 
passed the antitrust laws, "Congress was dealing with competi-
tion, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought 
to prevent. "59 Yet, the Court rarely has found the need to state 
precisely what "competition" embraces. While there are older 
53 ld. at 35. 
54 ld. at 36. 
55 ld. at 36 n. 4. 
56 "A tie-in should be condemned only when its anticompetitive 
impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency." ld. at 42. 
57 ld. at 36. 
58 For example, O'Connor cites Landes & Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 954 (1981) at 37 n. 7, and Bow-
man, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 
21-23 (1957) at 39 n. 9. 
59 Standard Oil v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 
(1951) (quoting A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 
135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943). 
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cases that are relatively explicit,60 only since the landmark opin-
ion in Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 
(1977) has a specific concern with efficiency consistently been at 
the forefront of Supreme Court antitrust analysis.61 This case 
was followed shortly by Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1978) ("BMr') and oth-
ers.62 Moreover, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 
60 For example, in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 
1, 4 (1958), the Court stated: 
The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions. 
See also United States v. E. L Du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 
386 (1956) ("A considerable size is often essential for efficient operation 
in research, manufacture and distribution"); Connell Constr. Co. v. 
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975) ("[C]om-
petition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws 
strive to protect"). 
61 In Sylvania the Court changed the standard of analysis for non-
price vertical restraints from per se illegality to the rule of reason largely 
because of the efficiencies they generate. The Court noted that while 
vertical restrictions can reduce competition in a number of ways: 
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allow-
ing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the 
distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues" are 
implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under 
the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number of 
ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to 
compete more effectively against other manufacturers. ld. at 
54-55. 
62 BMI justified a blanket licensing provision because it "reduces 
cost" (id. at 21), would "serve a market need" (id. at 17 n. 27), obviates 
certain transaction costs (id.), and because "a bulk license of some type 
is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these 
efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate license is that 
its price must be established." ld. The Court inquired whether the pur-
pose of the practice was: 
(Footnote continued on following page) 
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(1979), Chief Justice Burger stated that the Sherman Act's legis-
lative debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act 
as a 'consumer welfare prescription' " (citing R. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978».63 Of course, Bork has asserted 
that the "consumer welfare prescription" embodied in the anti-
trust laws is limited to a concern with economic efficiency.64 
As the Court's subsequent discussion makes clear, however, 
it almost certainly was unaware that "consumer welfare," as 
Bork defines it, has little or nothing to do with the welfare of 
consumers. Moreover, Reiter implies that the antitrust laws con-
tain wealth transfer goals and a strong preference for con-
sumers: 
It is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of 
goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the 
framework of our competitive private enterprise system. . . . Here, 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-
market economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears 
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output, or instead one designed to 
"increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather 
than less, competitive" (citing United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n. 16 (1978). ld. at 19-20. 
In National Soc) of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679 (1978), the Court struck an anticompetitive association canon of 
ethics because "[tJhe Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that 
ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also 
better goods and services." ld. at 695. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978), the Court commented 
upon "the potential of serious distortion of the rational and efficient 
allocation of resources, and the efficiency of fiee markets which the 
regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is thought to 
engender." The Court in United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422,441 n. 16 
(1978), observed that a certain exchange of information among competi-
tors "does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such 
practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and 
render markets more, rather than less, competitive." 
63 442 U.S. at 343. 
64 R. BORK, supra note 9, Chapter 2. 
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where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation policy of her money 
because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially 
inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has 
alleged an injury in her 'property.' ... [The treble-damages remedy 
was passed] as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges 
resulting from price fixing. 6s 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hyde demonstrates 
that the view that antitrust should only be concerned with 
economic efficiency may have as many as four Supreme Court 
votes. But, for the present, a majority appears reluctant to 
restrict antitrust to efficiency. This cursory overview of recent 
cases has shown a trend from a concern with competition to a 
concern with the efficiency that results from competition. But the 
Chicagoist victory is not complete. 
II. The "counterrevolution" begins 
A. Analyzing the legislative history correctly 
Many older cases imply that one purpose of the antitrust 
laws is to prevent the formation of market power that, when 
exercised, transfers wealth from consumers to firms with market 
power. 66 Yet, although many doubted Bork's legislative history 
65 442 U.S. at 339-43. This language accords with statements from 
earlier cases implying wealth transfer principles. For example, in 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1%7), the Court implied 
that it was an antitrust goal to "protect the public from price gouging 
by dealers who had monopoly power .... " In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 263 (1976), Justice White, in dicta in a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, stated that "[t]he antitrust laws are 
aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price fixing, which gouge the 
consumer. " 
66 See, e.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machine, 392 U.S. 481, 
489 (1967); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477,486 (1976); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 
305, 309 n. 9 (1956) (condemned an "intent to gouge consumers"); 
Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) 
("the Sherman Act was enacted to assure consumers the benefits of 
price competition. . . "). 
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analysis,67 well over a decade passed before Bork's conclusions 
were challenged in detail. 68 
Bork had correctly noted that the Sherman Act's legislative 
history is replete with concern over the higher prices facing con-
sumers as a result of monopoly pricing. But he was mistaken 
that Congressional concern fairly can be equated to a desire to 
avoid economic inefficiency. None of the quotations Bork 
presents suggest that Congress was even aware that supra-
competitive prices lead to economic efficiency. 69 Even leading 
economists of the day had only a tenuous understanding of this 
concept70 and, as conservative Nobel Laurate George Stigler 
reminds us, no economist had any significant effect on the 
Sherman Act's passage. 71 Not surprisingly, Bork's hundreds of 
67 See, e.g., Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat 
From Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 976-79 (1977) (using common sense to 
conclude that Congress must have been more concerned about wealth 
transfers than efficiency). 
68 See Lande, supra note 8. The legislative history material in this 
article has been taken from this source. 
69 See Bork, supra note 8, passim. 
70 Scherer observed that although a few nineteenth century econo-
mists discussed what we today term allocative efficiency insofar as it 
related to taxation and the government regulation of public utilities: 
"The notion of a 'deadweight welfare-loss triangle' entered the main-
stream of Anglo-American economics in the first edition [1890] of Mar-
shall's Principles [citation omitted]." Scherer, supra note 67, at 977 
n. 20. Moreover, the first rigorous discussion of allocative efficiency did 
not appear until 1938. HoteIIing, The General Welfare in Relation to 
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMET-
RICA 242 (1938). Even this relatively modern analysis did not discuss the 
antitrust implications of allocative inefficiency. 
71 "A careful student of the history of economics would have 
searched long and hard, on July 2, 1890, the day the Sherman Art was 
signed by President Harrison, for any economist who had ever recom-
mended the policy of activity combating collusion or monopolization in 
the economy at large." Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of 
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982). Professor Hofstadter 
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citations to the 1890 debates fail to contain evidence that even a 
single Congressman knew that monopoly pricing is inefficient. 
Put simply, Congress did not condemn the trusts for a lack of 
efficiency. 
Congress was well aware, however, that higher prices trans-
fer wealth from consumers to firms with market power. The 
debates strongly suggest that Congress condemned trusts and 
monopolies for exactly this reason.72 For example, Senator Sher-
man termed monopolistic overcharges "extortion which makes 
the people poor," and "extorted wealth. "73 Congressman Coke 
referred to the overcharges as "robbery. "74 Representative 
Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest 
equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the people."7s 
Congressman Wilson complained that a particular trust "robs 
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.' '76 
Representative Fithian declared that the trusts were "impover-
ishing" the people through "robbery."77 Senator Hoar declared 
that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose 
of which is to extort from the community . . . wealth which 
observed that "[t]he Sherman Act was framed and debated in the pre-
expert era, when economists as a professional group were not directly 
consulted by legislators. But even if they had been, they would have 
given mixed and uncertain advice." R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style 
in American Politics and Other Essays 199-200 (1965). 
72 This paper only analyzes the legislative history of the Sherman 
Act. For a similar analysis of the legislative history of the Clayton Act, 
Federal Trade Commission Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act, demonstrat-
ing that these laws' framers cared more about wealth transfers than effi-
ciency, see Lande, supra note 8. 
73 21 Congo Rec. 2461 (1890). 
74 ld. at 2614. 
75 ld. at 410l. 
76 ld. at 4098. 
77 ld. at 4103 (Fifthian was reading, with apparent approval, a let-
ter from a constituent). 
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ought to be generally diffused over the whole community.»7S 
Senator George complained: "They aggregate to themselves great 
enormous wealth by extortion which makes the people poor."79 
These value-laden condemnations of the wealth extraction 
effects of monopoly pricing show a much broader concern than 
economic efficiency. A fair reading of the Sherman Act's legisla-
tive history reveals that it is largely a consumer protection statute. 
Congress' primary reason for passing the antitrust laws was to 
prevent consumers from paying more than the competitive level 
for their goods and services. Bork tried to make the stockholders 
of monopolies and cartels into honorary consumers; the con-
sumers that Congress wanted to protect included only purchasers 
of goods and services. 80 
B. Triangles and rectangles disentangled 
Despite the common sense that truly underlay Congressional 
intent it is not difficult to understand how Bork's story gained 
such widespread acceptance. Perhaps the most important reason 
was his clever but deceptive selection of his key term, "con-
sumer welfare," as the lodestar of antitrust. Few people realize 
how he counterintuitively defined it to exclude a concern with 
the welfare of ordinary consumers. Bork succeeded in promot-
78 Id. at 2728. 
79 Id. at 1768. Senator George continued: "Then making this 
extorted wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate 
victims, the people of the United States, they pursue unmolested, unre-
strained by law. . . . [fhey] have extorted their ill-gotten gains from 
the poor and then used the money thus obtained to complete the ruin of 
the people." Id. Senator George complained that consumers were being 
robbed. Id. at 3150. He also complained that the trusts were able to 
"fleece and rob the people." Id. 
80 This article asserts that the wealth transfer standard should gov-
ern antitrust because Congress has so ordered, not because it is the supe-
rior approach. That is the subject of another article that the author is 
working on. 
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ing this interpretation largely because the subject is extremely 
complex; few understand that monopoly prices lead to both 
allocative inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from consumers 
to the monopolist. As Bork translated legislative intent into tri-
angles and rectangles and then back to an appealing term like 
"consumer welfare," few discovered what he had really done. 81 
Even the Supreme Court appears to have been confused.82 Per-
haps the clearest illustration of the complexity of the issues is 
that Bork, in his landmark legislative history analysis, twice 
appeared to suggest that the antitrust laws are concerned with 
wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power! 83 
81 I have argued elsewhere that Bork's interpretations of Congres-
sional intent in his original area of specialization demonstrate that he is 
a judicial activist for his ideological causes. Contrary to his protesta-
tions and those of his champions, Bork selectively interprets Congres-
sional will to suit his own agenda; he does not defer to a Congress that 
had different goals. Bork saves his "strict constructionist" view of a 
judge's role for instances when this posture is consistent with his prefer-
red ends. In other cases he finds a way to reach the result demanded by 
his ideology and denounces contrary conclusions as "unconstitutional." 
See Lande, Just Where Does Judge Bork Stand?-An Anti-Antitrust 
Activist? NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 13 col. 4. Most of this article's 
discussions of Bork's views are taken from this piece or from Lande, 
supra note 8. 
82 Recall the discussion of Reiter, supra Section I(D). 
83 Bork observed that the argument in Congress for a rule against 
monopolistic mergers "derived in large measure from a desire to protect 
consumers from monopoly extortion. . . . Where producer and con-
sumer welfare might come into conflict. . . Congress chose consumer 
welfare as decisive." Bork, supra note 8, at 11. A concern with 
"monopoly extortion" and "consumer," as opposed to "producer" 
welfare would seem to be identical to a concern with the income distri-
bution effects of economic activity that Bork repeatedly said were to 
have nothing to do with antitrust. 
In addition, Bork discussed § 1 of Sherman's bill in a way that indi-
cated his belief that Congress employed price, not efficiency, as its stan-
dard. "[T]hat bill declared illegal two classes of arrangements, 
contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations: (1) those made with a 
view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition, and (2) those 
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to consumer of articles of 
commerce." [d. at 15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Bork ana-
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If even Bork can use the concepts imprecisely it is not surprising 
so many were confused. 
c. Administrability counterarguments 
The efficiency approach, if carried out through clearly 
designed rules (such as well specified merger guidelines rather 
than the ad hoc case-by-case analysis used during much of the 
Reagan administration), would indeed prove relatively more 
workable than a "big is bad, small is good" approach. But an 
efficiency orientation is certainly no easier to administer and no 
more predictable than a price (that is, a wealth transfer) 
approach. Under each the required quantities-a prediction of 
both market power and efficiencies-are virtually identical. 
From a theoretical perspective both involve ascertaining virtu-
ally the same triangles and rectangles. 84 From a practical per-
spective, both are often unworkable on a case-by-case basis 
since the required quantities are generally unknowable. 85 Both 
necessitate implementation through general presumptions or 
rules. But the two approaches lead to very different rules. 86 
lyzed this language in the following manner. "Sherman employed these 
two criteria of illegality in every measure he presented to the Senate. The 
first test, which subjects all firms to market forces, is hardly a means of 
preserving social values that consumers are not willing to pay for. It can 
be reconciled only with a consumer-welfare policy. The second test is 
even more explicit. The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to con-
sumers. There were no exceptions. Sherman wanted the courts not 
merely to be influenced by the consumer interest but to be controlled 
completely by it." Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
84 The "price to consumers" standard actually requires less infor-
mation and is more workable. See A. Fisher, F. Johnson & R. Lande, 
Mergers, Market Power and Property Rights: When Will Efficiencies 
Prevent Price Increases? (September, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) 
(FTC Working Paper No. 130). 
8S R. BORK, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
86 Bork wrote that mergers should be evaluated solely in terms of 
efficiency effects. He would evaluate mergers that gave rise both to allo-
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Consider two differences that would arise if a new set of 
federal antitrust enforcers attempted to use a supposedly 
"unconstitutional" antitrust law to prevent consumers from 
being forced to pay monopoly extortion.87 Both would lead to 
significantly more aggressive antitrust enforcement. 
The first would be the undramatic lowering of the DOJ 
Merger Guidelines' numerical threshold levels. For illustration, 
reconsider the diagram and the Williamsonian approach to 
merger enforcement discussed in Section I(C), supra. Suppose 
we formulate merger guidelines based only on the efficiency cri-
teria, and suppose we believe that the point where the ineffi-
ciencies from most mergers outweigh their efficiency benefits 
occurs on the average when a merger produces an HHI increase 
of 200 to a level of 2000 (figures closer to the current "practi-
cal" levels used by the Department of Justice, despite the nomi-
nally lower levels written into the 1984 Merger Guidelines). 
Now, consider the effect of also incorporating the wealth trans-
fer effects of the merger. As the diagram illustrates, these 
effects are almost always large relative to the accompanying 
inefficiency effects.88 Incorporation of Congress' intent to count 
these transfers would produce significantly lower merger guide-
lines than would the efficiency approach.89 But administrability 
would not be affected. 
More dramatically, consider a merger that produced an effi-
cient monopolist that would raise prices significantly (recall the 
cative inefficiency (from higher price) and productive efficiency gains 
(from, for example, economies of scale) by setting the thresholds of ille-
gality in the merger guidelines high enough to allow most productive 
efficiency gains and prevent most allocative inefficiency losses. But he 
would not allow a generalized efficiencies defense. R. BoRK, supra note 
9, at 221-22. 
ff1 For additional differences, see Sims & Lande, The End of 
Antitrust-or a New Beginning? 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 316-18 (1986). 
88 See discussion infra at Section III(B). 
89 The particulars of the tradeoff calculations are extremely com-
plex. See Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, Afterword: Could a Merger Lead 
to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983). 
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Allied case, supra, Section I(C». The efficiency approach would 
ask only whether the merger produced (net) efficiencies. If so, 
one would approve the merger even though all the efficiency 
savings from the merger would accrue to the monopolist while 
consumers would be forced to pay significantly higher prices. 
By co~trast, an "unconstitutional" merger policy truly based 
upon Congressional intent would block such mergers. A 
"wealth transfer" or "price to consumer" approach to merger 
enforcement would ask a different question: is the merger likely 
to lead to significantly higher prices for consumers? If the 
answer is "yes" the merger would be blocked, even though this 
would prevent the formation of an efficient monopoly. Con-
gress cared more about protecting consumers from monopoly 
extortion than obtaining the "benefits" of allowing efficient 
monopolies. Again, the result would be different, but it would 
be at least ~qually administrable. 
Ironically, while the efficiency school's founders' concern 
for predictability and objective administrability was admirable, 
some of their disciples in the Reagan administration appear not 
to have fully grasped their teachers' message. Perhaps the disci-
ples focused too much on the technical aspects of Chicago 
School economics at the expense of broader Chicago School 
philosophical concerns. For example, the 1984 Merger Guide-
lines in effect announce that the Department will listen to any 
type of efficiency claim and give it any weight the Department 
deems appropriate.!lO This approach to merger enforcement 
inflicts administrability and business planning havoc comparable 
to that committed by the social and political approach the Chi-
cagoists denounce on predictability grounds. Thus, even though 
the efficiency school gained many adherents because of its 
promise of superior administration, its practical implementation 
cannot be shown to be superior. 
90 u.s. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984), 2 TRADE REG. 
REP. (CCH) 1 4494.103 at 4.135. For other examples of how the current 
Merger Guidelines do not embody clear rules, see Sims & Lande, "DOJ 
Adds Revisionist Dollop to '82 Merger Guidelines," Legal Times, June 
25, 1984 at 15, col. 1. 
Efficiency 455 
III. The start of efficiency's decline 
A. The Ucounterrevolution" gains momentum 
It is not surprising that many established moderate and lib-
eral antitrust scholars quickly endorsed the idea that an impor-
tant goal of antitrust is to protect consumers from monopoly 
overcharges. It would have been startling if scholars such as 
Professors Adams, Brodley, Flynn, Fox, Pitofsky, Schwartz or 
L. Sullivan rejected the idea. Of perhaps greater significance 
has been this view's adoption by antitrust's most influential 
"centrist" academic and its embrace by an outstanding group 
of relatively young scholars who comprise a large portion of the 
emerging generation of influential antitrust academics. 
In 1980 Professor Areeda appeared to endorse the view that 
economic efficiency should be the only factor in antitrust analY-
sis.9) He stated more recently that a broader perspective was 
appropriate, observing that even if a hypothetical, perfectly dis-
criminating cartel caused no inefficiency: 
[It] is taking from some people and giving to the other people more 
than competition would. I regard this as an anticompetitive distor-
tion. "Consumer welfare" embraces what individual consumers are 
entitled to expect from a competitive economy. If the efficiency 
extremists insist that only their definition of consumer welfare is 
recognized by economists, we would answer that ours is clearly 
recognized by the statutes. The legislative history of the Sherman Act 
is not clear on much but it is clear on this.92 
Many younger scholars concur.93 Professor Hovenkamp, 
a self-described Chicago School "fellow traveler" for some 
91 See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 149 n. 2 (1980). 
92 Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 
523, 536 (1983). Since Areeda testified in favor of Bork's nomination to 
the Supreme Court it would be interesting to know whether Bork was 
one of the "efficiency extremists" to whom Areeda referred. 
93 "Younger" is used as a relative term to include open-minded 
thinkers even if they have some gray hair. 
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time,94 now explicitly embraces wealth transfers as an important 
concern of antitrusU' Professors Campbell,96 Jorde,97 Kaplow,98 
Kovacic,99 Krattenmaker, 100 Ross, 101 Salop,I02 T. Sullivan, 103 
94 Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 
213 (1985). 
9S Hovenkamp recently addressed the issue of the legislative intent 
behind the antitrust laws and concluded that efficiency was not the pri-
mary concern of the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act or the 
Celler-Kefauver Act. Id. at 250. He termed Bork's Sherman Act legisla-
tive history analysis the strongest argument in favor of efficiency but 
concluded that "Bork's work has been called into question by subse-
quent scholarship showing that . . . Congress had no real ~oncept of 
efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers from 
unfavorable wealth transfers." Id. 
96 See Campbell, Has Economics Rationalized Antitrust?, 52 ANTI. 
TRUST L.J. 607, 617 (1983) (focusing largely upon the Robinson-Patman 
Act). 
97 See, e.g., Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Inte-
grated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1984). 
98 Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis 
and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1817, 1822-23 
(1982). 
99 See Kovacic's article in this volume. 
100 Krattenmaker & Salop, An Antitrust Analysis of Exclusionary 
Behavior, 94 YALE L.J. 209, 279-80 (1986). 
101 See S. Ross, Sports Broadcasting, Antitrust, and Public Policy, 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Busi-
ness Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(Oct. 6, 1987). 
102 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 100. 
103 Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's 
Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 
(1982). 
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WileylOi and many others have come to similar conclusions. 
Unlike the earlier list of more established scholars, each views 
antitrust questions mostly or entirely in economic terms. But their 
economics embraces more than efficiency. 
The State Attorneys General, rapidly becoming an important 
factor in the antitrust world, agree. They vigorously endorsed 
wealth transfers as the primary concern of merger policy in their 
1987 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. lOS And, although courts still 
generally do not focus upon the differences between the 
approaches, some are beginning to recognize that Bork's defIni-
tion of "consumer welfare" is too narrowlD6 or is in doubt. 107 
104 Wiley has expressed this view in several articles. See. e.g .• Revi-
sion and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277. 1283 
n. 32 (1987); Antitrust and Core Theory. 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 587 
n. 109 (1987); A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism. 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 749 n. 165 (1986); t< 'After Chicago' An Exaggerated 
Demise?" 6 DUKE L.J. 1006, 1011 n. 38 (1986). 
lOS "When a firm or firms exercise market power by profitably 
maintaining prices above competitive levels for a significant period of 
time a transfer of wealth from consumers to those firms occurs. This 
transfer of wealth is the major evil sought to be addressed by section 7." 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys 
General, 52 Special Supp. Antitrust & Trade Reg. (BNA) No. 1306, at 
S-4 (March 12. 1987) (footnotes omitted). 
106 See Judge Wald's concurrence to Judge Bork's opinion in 
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines. 792 F.2d 210, 231, n. 3 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Even if one thinks that the Court intended to exclude 
all other considerations, the phrase 'consumer welfare' surely includes 
more than simple economic efficiency"). The Court in Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1032 (9th 
Cir. 1981), eert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). shrewdly observed: 
Most commentators who have attempted to develop economic 
tests of predatory pricing have assumed that the goal of these 
tests should be the efficient allocation of society's resources, or. 
in the language of welfare economics. the improvement of 
allocative efficiency .•.. The relevance of the economic tests 
so developed. however. must then depend in large part on 
whether allocative efficiency is a primary goal of the antitrust 
laws. . . . [In our opinion] the search for allocative efficiency 
may lead one to accept conduct that is plainly anticompetitive. 
107 Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co .• 727 F.2d 692. 701. n. 9 (1984). 
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B. The Reagan administration's no longer solid front 
Many Reagan Administration antitrust officials remain 
faithful to Baxter and Miller's legacy. lOS For example, the cur-
rent Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles F. Rule, 
confidently asserts that the only goal of the antitrust laws is to 
maximize economic efficiency. 109 He affirmatively declines to 
enforce the antitrust laws in a manner that favors consumers 
over cartels, noting: "[1]t is not necessarily clear who--the con-
sumer or the producer-is more worthy of the surplus generated 
by a particular transaction. "llO Rule combatively opines that 
"all too often" those ,not sharing his beliefs are engaging in 
"demagoguery"lll and asserts that including values other than 
efficiency in antitrust "is a prescription for tyranny. "lIZ 
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Daniel Oliver uses 
equally strident language. ll3 But Oliver's statements about the 
lOS FfC Commissioner Calvani, for example, strongly maintains 
that the only proper concern of antitrust is economic efficiency. See 
Calvani, Consumer Welfare Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal 
Times, Dec. 24/31, 1984, at 14 col. 1. 
109 C. Rule, Remarks at the 21st New England Antitrust Conference, 
Antitrust, Consumers and Small Business, Cambridge, MA, passim, 
especially at pp. 3-6, 8-9 (Nov. 13, 1987). 
110 Id. at 4-5. 
11l Id. at 1. 
112 Id. at 9. 
113 In a recent interview Chairman Oliver stated that under the 
Administration's approach to evaluating mergers and acquisitions "the 
crucial question is whether such transactions will substantially lessen 
competition-and hence injure consumers-by increasing price or 
reducing output." Statement of Chairman Oliver, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 
235, 237 (1988). Oliver then denounced "counter-revolutionaries" (id. 
at 241) who advocate "nonlearning-antitrust laws as a mechanism to 
prevent wealth transfers." Id. at 242 (quoting Professor Rose with 
approval) (citation omitted). Oliver also denounced "[t]he confiscatory, 
redistributive, and wealth-destructive policies of yesterday's [antitrust 
enforcement]. Id. at 243. 
(Footnote continued on following page) 
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subject contradict one another; either he misunderstands the 
price/efficiency distinction or deliberately confuses it in an 
attempt to make it appear that he cares about protecting con-
sumers from monopoly extortion.1u 
Further evidence of a "counterrevolution" is, however, pro-
vided by the Reagan Administration's no longer solid support 
for a pure efficiency model. This is prominently evidenced by 
the Administration's proposed Merger Modernization Act of 
1986. The Administration proposed changing Section 7's ban 
against certain mergers the effect of which may be "substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," 
to a requirement that forbidden mergers "increase the ability to 
exercise market power."1IS The Bill adds: "For the purposes of 
this section, the ability to exercise market power is defined as 
the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices 
above competitive levels for a significant period of time. "116 
This is virtually the equivalent of a wealth transfer standard 
since any merger that leads to higher prices to consumers will be 
blocked, regardless of whether it produces net efficiencies. Effi-
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
Oliver has contradicted himself. Merger enforcement aimed at pre-
venting higher prices to consumers does prevent wealth transfers from 
consumers to firms with market power. Merger enforcement that 
ignored wealth transfer concerns would permit higher prices to con-
sumers so long as the resulting monopoly was efficient. Oliver cannot 
both be in favor of protecting consumers from injury caused by higher 
prices and also be against preventing wealth transfers from consumers 
to firms with market power. 
Perhaps Chairman Oliver doesn't realize that it is the cartels and 
monopolies (not the antitrust laws) that are engaging in the redistribu-
tion of wealth. The antitrust laws are supposed to be used to prevent 
cartels and monopolies from using their market power to extract con-
sumers' wealth. This wealth is the property of consumers because Con-
gress gave consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods. 
114 ld. 
115 See S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a) (1986). The Bill would 
make many other changes, including a new standard of proof. 
116 ld. at § 2(d). 
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ciencies "deriving from the acquisition" are relevant only inso-
far as they affect the firm's ability to increase prices.1I7 
It is, of course,. unclear the extent to which the Administra-
tion's merger proposal represented its preferred solution,118 a 
concession to political reality, 119 or a recognition that in many 
circumstances an efficiency standard will provide less clarity for 
117 ld. Interestingly, both the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines are 
ambiguous as to whether more than economic efficiency will count in 
the Department's merger analysis, merely noting that a merger can 
cause both: "[T]he result [of market power] is a transfer of wealth from 
buyers to sellers and a misallocation of resources." U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice Merger Guidelines 1982, 2 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) , 4501 (footnote 
omitted); 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 90 at '4491. 
118 A strong supporter of such legislation, former Assistant Attorney 
General Douglas H. Ginsburg, noted: 
Under the Merger Modernization Act [of 1986], an efficiency-
enhancing but price-increasing merger could be interdicted. As 
a matter of enforcement discretion, however, I would have been 
unlikely, as Assistant Attorney General, to have opposed a 
merger that was demonstrably efficient. At the same time, I 
hasten to point out, however, that I did not find the efficiencies 
claim persuasive in any of the admittedly few merger reviews 
where the point was argued .... [However,] [p]articularly in 
view of the infrequency with which efficiency showings can 
convincingly be made on behalf of a proposed merger, a price-
driven standard for mergers would do more to avoid lost 
efficiencies through over-enforcement (of the Von's, Brown, or 
PNB sort) than could possibly be lost by the occasional block-
ing of a merger that would be both price and efficiency 
enhancing. 
Letter from Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 3, 
1988). Ginsburg cautions that one carefully should observe the distinc-
tion "between the interpretation of present law and a proposal for 
change, such as the Merger Modernization Act." ld. 
119 Neither the Antitrust Division nor the FfC has ever publicly 
stated that it refused to challenge a merger, despite the expectation of 
higher prices, because of anticipated efficiencies. They are not so 
foolish-imagine the reaction in Congress if either the FfC or the Anti-
trust Division announced it would not challenge a merger likely to lead 
to significantly higher prices for consumers because the resulting 
monopoly would be efficient! 
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businesses and will be harder to administer.l20 But it matters 
little. 
There is even an indication that Judge Easterbrook may be 
starting to mellow. A Reagan appointee, Judge Easterbrook has 
long been a respected advisor and mentor to many Reagan 
Administration antitrust officials and one of the most influen-
tial members of antitrust's efficiency school. 121 He recently 
wrote that when Congress passed the Sherman Act: 
The choice they saw was between leaving consumers at the mercy of 
trusts and authorizing the judges to protect consumers. However you 
slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of 
consumers from overcharges. 122 
120 For example, Posner admits that in certain cirCUIqstances effi-
ciency is too difficult to measure. He advocates instead using an output 
test. See, e.g., Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of 
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 6, 21 
(1981). Since restricted output causes supracompetitive prices, an output 
standard is very similar to a proscription against practices that lead to 
higher prices for consumers. 
There are, of course, some differences between an output standard 
and a wealth transfer standard. In cases where output is completely 
inelastic, such as in Allied, discussed supra, Section I(C), the two stan-
dards would lead to different results. In addition, Posner would not 
appear to condemn Areeda's hypothetical, perfectly price-discriminating 
cartel since such a cartel would not reduce output. 
An output standard also was recently proposed by the Director of 
the FrC's Office of Policy Development, Nolan Clark. He argues that 
the Sherman Act's proscription against certain practices "in restraint of 
trade" (26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 1 (1976» was 
meant to constitute a ban against practices that restrain output (since 
trade is only restrained when output decreases). Clark contrasts his pro-
posal with an efficiency standard and explains why reduced output and 
reduced efficiency are not identical. See Clark, Antitrust Comes Full 
Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. REv. 
1125, 1168-70 (1985). . 
121 See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. 
REv. 1, 3-4 (1984). 
122 Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 
1702-03 (1986). 
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Easterbrook then asserted: 
This turns out to be the same program as one based on "efficiency." 
There are differences at the margins. . . but the differences are not 
very important. . . [especially because] [i]n the long run consumers 
gain most from a policy that emphasized allocative and productive 
efficiency. 123 
Easterbrook thus appears to concede that the wealth transfer 
view of the antitrust laws' legislative histories is more accurate, 
but argues that it leads to conclusions that differ only slightly 
from the efficiency approach. 
If the gap between the Chicago School and the adherents of a 
wealth transfer approach has narrowed to an acceptance of the 
latter perspective with disagreement over how important it will be 
for antitrust, this article's thrust has been overly cautious. Anti-
trust soon will march in a new direction. Only after we have 
worked out these differences will we truly know where its destina-
tion lies. 
This is not the place to analyze either the magnitude of the 
differences between the two approaches or the practical effects of 
these differences on various types of antitrust cases. But it is 
noteworthy that the inefficiency effects of market power are 
surprisingly modest. 124 Easterbrook recently estimated that they 
123 ld. at 1703. It probably is true that the wealth transfer and effi-
ciency approaches differ more in the short run. Long run and indirect 
effects are more difficult to predict. 
124 "The first estimate of the loss to the American economy caused 
by monopolistic misallocations was presented by Arnold Harberger in 
1954. If the results of Harberger's estimates were expressed in terms of 
1982 dollars, they would be equal to approximately $12.00 per person 
per year .... It is hardly surprising that other economists arrive at dif-
ferent estimates, some of which are lower than Harberger's, while oth-
ers are larger (some even by a factor of 50). Scherer's review of the 
evidence puts the figure 'between 0.5 and 2 percent of the gross national 
product [between approximately $50 and $200 per person per year] with 
estimates nearer the lower bound inspiring more confidence than those 
on the higher side. . . .' The more important question is what the mag-
nitude of this loss would be if there were no antitrust laws to act as both 
deterrent and corrective systems. It may be impossible, however, to for-
mulate a meaningful estimate of this figure." Lande, supra note 8, at 73 
n.32. 
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are half as large as the transfer effects,l25 a figure that is probably 
an overestimate. l26 Even if we accept his estimate, however, we 
must conclude that "what's wrong" with market power is 
approximately trebled when the transfer is also included-a result 
bound to lead to many significantly tighter antitrust rules. 127 
At least two types of areas will be affected. First, antitrust 
rules based upon a balance of procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects will shift and proscribe much more behavior. Horizontal 
merger guidelines, for example, would be significantly lower if 
the wealth transfer effects of mergers also are included. l28 Second, 
practices without significant inefficiency effects could become 
illegal if they are used by firms with market power to extract 
wealth from consumers. Areeda's perfectly price-discriminating 
cartel is one such example. As the discussion supra Section I(C) 
suggests, some uses of tying or other vertical restraints to price 
discriminate might be illegal only under a wealth transfer view. l29 
And the Allied discussion, supra Section I(C) , shows that a 
practice in an industry with relatively inelastic demand might also 
be treated very differently if wealth transfers are considered. 
125 Easterbrook, Panel Discussion, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 126 
(1986). 
126 See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1644-50 (1983). 
127 This is only an approximation, and probably an underestimate of 
the differences. One weighing approach would be to give wealth trans-
fers equal weight to efficiency effects in the tradeoff calculations. 
Another approach, probably more in line with Congressional intent, 
would forbid any merger likely to lead to a significant extraction of con-
sumers' surplus by firms with market power. The latter approach would 
use price to consumers as its benchmark. In cases involving price dis-
crimination, however, it might be more meaningful to focus upon 
wealth transfers than consumer prices. 
128 Fisher & Lande, supra note 126, passim. 
129 See also Lande, Untangling Tying (1988) (unpublished manu-
script) (draft). 
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IV. The future 
Robert Bork's Supreme Court nomination was not rejected 
because he refused to embrace more than efficiency in antitrust 
analysis. But his rejection might portend that his antitrust views 
also will come to be rejected. 
When the efficiency-only view replaced the social/political 
perspective many in the antitrust community refused to convert. 
Some refused out of inertia, but most probably balked at sup-
porting Bork's illogical reading of the antitrust laws' legislative 
histories. 
We appear to be at another watershed, one which may split 
the antitrust community partly along generational lines. Rela-
tively young, intellectually honest conservatives will tend to join 
moderates and liberals of all ages in accepting the new wisdom. 
Some will do so by admitting their past errors; others will attempt 
to cloud the differences and their past positions. But many in the 
efficiency school will be more rigid and close-minded, especially 
those who have invested years or decades believing in its exclusiv-
ity. The future of antitrust will leave them behind, but because of 
their strength what should be a peaceful transition will instead be 
a lengthy struggle. 
Like the previous round, this contest probably will be influ-
enced not only by the actual intentions of the Congresses that 
enacted the antitrust laws but by a Presidential election as well. If 
conservativesl30 are placed in charge of the federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies following the 1988 elections the efficiency 
standard will die much more slowly. It is even possible that a 
President Bush could appoint several justices to the Supreme 
130 Terms like "conservative" have been used arbitrarily and with 
license throughout this article. It is, of course, incorrect to view "con-
servatives" as opposed to vigorous antitrust enforcement and "liberals" 
in favor. See, e.g., L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY at 146-50 (1980). 
It is also incorrect to assume that the election of George Bush in 1988 
will produce Reagan-era antitrust enforcement since many Republicans 
favor strong antitrust enforcement. 
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Court who agreed with Bork on the issue and the efficiency 
school would reign for the foreseeable future. 
If the Democrats capture the White House and retain control 
of both houses of Congress, however, the transition will be much 
more rapid. On the efficiency side probably would be several 
Supreme Court justices, many Reagan-appointed federal judges, 
a large percentage of established antitrust academics, and a 
generally conservative defense bar. On the consumers' side would 
be other Supreme Court justices and lower court judges, many 
influential congressmen, the state and federal antitrust enforcers, 
and at least a few increasingly astute plaintiffs' lawyers. 131 There 
will also be growing pressure from an increasing number of 
academics. 
In many areas of the law academics have little impact. During 
the past generation, however, an influential group of articulate, 
aggressive antitrust scholars have developed and delineated the 
effects of an efficiency-oriented view of antitrust policy and have 
successfully advocated its implementation. The future of antitrust 
is economics and efficiency will always be important. We will not 
return to Brown Shoel32 antitrust for the foreseeable future, and 
many of the reasons why antitrust has long been in decline will be 
unaffected by the fall of efficiency's antitrust monopoly.133 But 
the practical ramifications of a price (or wealth transfer) standard 
are just beginning to be worked out. Aggressive academics, both 
lawyers and economists, can be expected to rise to the opportu-
nity and make compelling consumerist arguments to open minded 
judges and justices. These "young Turks" will provide ideas for 
and work symbiotically with consumer-oriented federal and state 
antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs for a revitalization of 
antitrust. 
131 For example, Fred Furth, who usually represents more antitrust 
plaintiffs than defendants, underwrote most of the expenses for the 
1987 Airlie House Conference that called for more vigorous antitrust 
enforcement. Lawyers like Furth can be expected to use the wealth 
transfer concept in litigation whenever so doing will benefit their clients. 
132 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
133 For additional analysis, see Sims & Lande, supra note 87. 
